Negociation, Threat and Transitivity

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Abstract. The article aims to highlight that in the business world, especially negotiation, it can be seen in at least two respects: threat and inference, emphasizing the second one. Although usually the two are opposites, sometimes they coincide. On the one hand, the opposition is that the threat is a tool of coercion, while inference is the tool of persuasion. On the other hand the two can coincide. In that case, the threat is not a dirty procedure. By means of threat is corrected the relationship between partners threat as ethics report. The instrument used here is called transitive inference scheme. Its premises are conditionals interpreted by two material implications. I bring actual the results of a previous research. According to those, each of the two implications has its own set of other truth functions as premises. Cartesian product of two sets of functions offer 36 pairs of premises for the conclusion which was originally obtained from two conditionals. The 36 schemes reasoning in this case are all possible inference schemes behavior of a partner during a negotiation and represent the main finding. Reasoning scheme and all its variants are all routines of thinking. Some are brief, others are more extensive. Some are more convincing than others. Inference scheme could also be part of the negotiation scenario. As a result, inference schemes guided behavior, should be prepared in advance. Studying anticipated the inferences to be used in negotiating we try to anticipate which of these inferences could be a more compelling for the business partner.

Keywords: negotiation, inference scheme, threat, transitivity, middle term, premises, conclusion, conditional, truth function

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Introduction

Coincidences and oppositions is main idea. From the point of view of theory of action, a business is an action with a beginning and an end point, in order to win. As an agent of the action, the businessman has a number of ways that he can pass between the two points. Both Law and Ethics to the extend they are applied, reduce the number of possible routes. On the other hand, Ethics does not mean neglect the gain and generally the purpose. Even according to ethics, one can emphasize the routes or the final score. In the first case, we talk

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about deontologist [McNaughton, 1998] ethics and in the second one about consequentialist ethics [ibidem, 1998]. Eventually not only reduces the number of ways, it lengthens the time for winning and getting a transaction.

The tacit assumptions is that of immediacy. For now and here the suspension of ethics can bring a higher gain and/or faster, but especially for only one of the participants. Which means an extreme concern for their needs. Negotiator with such conducts is sometimes called „red bulldozer“ [Prutianu, 2007], by short „red“ [Kennedy, 1998], or “soviet” [Cohen, 2006].

Next to it is the aggressive, the difficult one [Kennedy, 1998], but also negotiators as „milksop” [Prutianu, 2007], ”avoidant” [ibidem, 2007] and “delicate” [ibidem, 2007]. From the point of view of ethics of action, for example negotiator “red” is a particularly practitioner of consequentiality ethics [McNaughton, 1998]. As concerns the suspend of ethics speaks about dirty techniques. Beyond these, Nicholas Reid Schaffzin shows a list of 15 most important negotiation techniques with which we meet, not necessarily dirty. For each of these it is important to identify their specificity. Depending on it can solve such a situation [Schaffzin, 2007]. We conclude that a dirty technique, much more must be indentified in order to find implicitly solution. Leonard Koren and Peter Goodman also relates to the output of a deadlock [Koren & Goodman, 1997], and the defense of dirty techniques and strategies [ibidem, 1997].

Beyond the appearances, and immediate, along the medium or long terms, neglect of ethics can lead to the elimination of business environment. On the contrary, taking into account the ethical, businessman is maintained among them, it is a potential source of gains and for the possibility of opening their growth.

In this regard it is preferable to an ethics of bilateral gain [Cohen, 2006]. That is to display a script that starts with building trust each other [ibidem, 2006]. The end result is that even business partners offer help. It ensures devotion in some cases [ibidem, 2006]. Within it is recommended avoiding any type of adversity.

The fact that the businessman has a purpose and go a number of ways to achieve it, is a particularly appropriate case of instruction or technical regulation referred the finish logician Georg Henrik von Wright [von Wright, 1982]. The author shows that their standard wording is conditional. The antecedent and consequent order contains the way forward [ibidem, 1982]. In short, it is about statements like „if...then...“. Apply here would mean that if someone wants to get the gain then he should follow searching negotiation strategy.

Koren Leonard and Peter Goodman show, among other things, a general chapter in business in which is about negotiatons, and contracts are concluded, which involves the relationship with officials and advisers [Koren & Goodman, 1997].

The relation with these includes threat. Not only that this is not counted in the chapter of dirty tactics [ibidem, 1997], not only not excluded, but is even considered „a perfectly legitimate tactic“ [ibidem, 1997]. Even so, it is important that it be taken seriously by the addressee, to be applied and not to abuse it.

In the latter case the partner feeling cornered, could have a mutual reaction [ibidem, 1997]. The threat may be legitimate when the ominous refers to a competitor of threatening [ibidem, 1997] potential infringement of the law by the most threatened. A special case occurs as a legitimate threat when a defensive solution against other abuses against the law.
So the question aim to answer is a double one:

- Is posible the coincidence between threat and inference?
- How many are the different variants that someone can be threatened while negotiating?

First, it is important to recognize the partner’s strategy of negotiation, because depends on it to find the solution of defense. Also, the final result depends on the followed routines. Secondly, but not less important it is that logic analysis applied to negotiation highlights inference schemes and these are able to save the truth of the premises in the form of conclusion.

1. The Threat in Transitive Form

A specific sequence is possible in which a character named Ed, good at business and must meet financial expert whose language he does not understand. So Ed causes the expert to explain all its uncertainties under threat.

- "If I do not understand, I do not sign anything, and if I do not sign, you will not be paid”
  [Koren & Goodman, 1997]

What expresses a transitiveness which we associate the next table symbolism:

| 1. If [I do not understand, \(\neg p\)], then [I do not sign anything, \(\neg q\)] | \(\neg p \supset \neg q\) |
| 2. If [I do not sign, \(\neg q\)], then [you will not be paid, \(\neg r\)] | \(\neg q \supset \neg r\) |
| 3. Therefore if [I do not understand, \(\neg p\)], then [you will not be paid, \(\neg r\)] | \(\neg p \supset \neg r\) |

2. Conditional, Material Implication, its Premises and Rationing Schemes

All about compliance and the definition of the conditional are supposed to be known [Gheorghiu, 2015]. We suppose that a conditional expression is the natural form of the truth function implication materials. The conditions of the definition of truth that really functions intuitively playable, informal [idem, 2015] or technical, matriceal [Vergez & Huisman, 1995], that is supposed to be known.

In a previous article [Iliescu, 2013] I showed that the set of premise-functions of the \(p \supset q\) function, namely \(\{\neg p, q, p \& q, p \equiv q, p \subset q, p \nleq q\}\) [ibidem, 2013]. Thus, \(p \supset q\) is participating in a six schemes of inference number, having \(p \supset q\) as the same conclusion and the six truth function premises as different premises.

| \(\neg p\) | \(q\) | \(p \& q\) | \(p \equiv q\) | \(p \subset q\) | \(p \nleq q\) |
| \(p \supset q\) | \(p \supset q\) | \(p \supset q\) | \(p \supset q\) | \(p \supset q\) | \(p \supset q\) |

We detach from here a model of the form of the premises of material implication: contradictory of the antecedent, consequent, conjunction, material echivalence, “neither..nor...”-operator, and exception to the replication between the two members of the implication.

2.1. Ed 's Conditionals Premises and their Associated Rationing Schemes
We interpret the two Ed’s conditional, as expressions of the implication material truth function. There are pragmatic reasons for their truth-functional interpretation [Edgington, 2006]. As a result we have 1. The set of premises of each of the two conditionals: \( \mathcal{A}(\neg p \supset \neg q) = \{ p, \neg q, \neg p \land \neg q, \neg p \equiv \neg q, \neg p \not\leftrightarrow \neg q \} \); \( \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) = \{ q, \neg r, \neg q \land \neg r, \neg q \equiv \neg r, \neg q \not\leftrightarrow \neg r \} \); 2. The set of inference scheme to each of the two conditional’s Ed. Elements from \( \mathcal{A}(\neg p \supset \neg q) \) are premises having as conclusion \( \neg p \supset \neg q \). The same for \( \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \) \( \equiv \neg q \supset \neg r \).

2.1.1. Thirty-six Forms of Reasoning Ed’s Possible

Given the sets \( \mathcal{A}(\neg p \supset \neg q) \) and \( \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \) and Ed’s premisses, and its unspoken but necessary conclusion \( \neg p \supset \neg r \), we can built a set of inference schemes by transitivity between \( \mathcal{A}(\neg p \supset \neg q) \) and \( \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \) on the one hand and our character’s possible conclusion \( \neg p \supset \neg r \), on the other one. Because of this we built the cartesian product of two set of premisses \( \mathcal{A}(\neg p \supset \neg q) \times \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \), that is:

\[
\{ p, \neg q, \neg p \land \neg q, \neg p \equiv \neg q, \neg p \not\leftrightarrow \neg q \} \times \{ q, \neg r, \neg q \land \neg r, \neg q \equiv \neg r, \neg q \not\leftrightarrow \neg r \}
\]

We get thirty-six pairs of elements of its premises for so many schemes of one and the same conclusions inference of Ed. Just indicate the six group schemes formats such reasoning results: \( p \times \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \); \( \neg q \times \mathcal{A}(\neg p \supset \neg q) \); \( \neg p \land \neg q \times \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \); \( \neg p \equiv \neg q \times \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \); \( \neg p \not\leftrightarrow \neg q \times \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \); \( \neg p \not\leftrightarrow \neg q \times \mathcal{A}(\neg q \supset \neg r) \).

Ed expresses in his conditionals, \( \neg p \supset \neg q \) and \( \neg q \supset \neg r \). But these ones have their contrapositions as equivalent versions: \( q \supset p \) and \( r \supset q \). Recent authors as Popa repeats that [Popa, 1992]. From here follows that both the natural and the symbolic form in which I expressed initially Ed’s reasoning, may be redenominated by their contrapositions due to their equivalence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>„If I do not understand, then I do not sign anything.</th>
<th>If you will be paid, then I sign.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If I do not sign, then you will not be paid.</td>
<td>If I sign, then I understand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therefore if I do not understand, then you will not be paid.</td>
<td>Therefore if you will be paid, then I understand.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The simple contraposition makes less obvious classical transitivity. To keep it obvious, require a reversal of the premises, as we have done.

2.1.2. Transitivity and Some Properties

Even if Ed is not clear, his premises have necessarily as logical consequence \( \neg p \supset \neg r \), meaning that if Ed does not understand the explanation of the financial advisor then this will not be paid. Not only material implication is transitive but also the logical consequence relation. Thus, if \( P \vdash Q \) and \( Q \vdash R \) then we conclude that \( P \vdash R \). So, from \( \{ p, q \} \) results \( \neg p \supset \neg q \) \( \& \) \( \neg q \supset \neg r \) and from it results Ed’s unspoken conclusion, \( \neg p \supset \neg r \). This situation is general for every announced of the thirty six inference schemes in the previous paragraph. The situation is obviously likened to a type of classic transitivity, based on a conjunctive medium term [Iliescu, 2008].

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Conclusions

L. Koren and P. Goodman divide negotiations as follows: confrontation, cooperation and neutral situations [Koren & Goodman, 1997]. Here, we chose to analyze the situation from a logical perspective neutral, i.e. interaction with financial specialist. We surprised the presence of valid logical reasoning schemes: transitivity called classical. We interpreted this transitive conditionals composing truth function as material implication. Connecting with previous results, we determined that Ed's premises, have themselves premises some of which even simpler. Schemes used at one time thought of Ed are one of a much larger number of possible schemes. Left to see if use of that reasoning scheme is random and is the result of an election or not.

The threat, contains an imperative concerning threatened by the menacing, which does not explicitly mention Koren and Goodman [ibidem, 1997]. At the same time it should contain reference to the hierarchy of goals two for the same time points [Kraus & Sycara & Eventchik, 1998]. As the negotiation procedure, the threat is ethical rejectable. But it is not the same case when what is causing your partner threat is that it is unintelligible in bargaining. And intelligibility is a minimum ethics prerequisite for the partner. Both businessman and the financial advisor seem to guide by the same general scheme of practical inference. Both of them: desire to happen t, for the first meaning to understand the explanations, for the second, to be paid; believe that action s will produce t; this opinion of them is true. Therefore they produce s [Papineau, 1996].

Openings

It thus foreshadows some research directions. One of them refers to the inverse of the original conception of ethics governing the conduct of business. Reverse direction is the moral rules are negotiated themselves being revised and reinterpreted [Thuderoz, 2002]. In its extension, is the sociological significance question, whether the interpretation of the rules, including moral, not jeopardize social glue which is provided if the same rules [ibidem, 2002]. The answer, only foreshadowed here is negative. They might consider extreme degrees of interpretation, review, both maximum and minimum as both indeed, poor social glue. Still there is a measure of the revision, between extreme operating on the background of social conflicts [ibidem, 2002]. Another direction not at all less important is that negotiating also means influencing. This concept could be reconstructed by means of action von Wright’s language [von Wright, 1982], that means inter-subjectively controllable.

References


